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Introduction
In the contemporary democracies with a proportional representation component there are rare instances in which the election winner gains sufficient shares of votes to govern alone. Most of the times, the largest parliamentary party has the opportunity to form a government coalition and thus invite aboard a few partners. Focusing on this process, scholars of coalition-formation have extensively tried to explain what parties get into government and to identify the determinants of their participation (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; Riker 1962; de Swaan 1973; Laver and Schofield 1992; Baron 1993; van Roozendaal 1993; Strom et al. 1994; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Warwick 1996; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 2010; Mattila and Raunio 2004) . While the presence in government of mainstream and niche ideological parties is often determined by their policy positions and / or size, ethnic parties display different features that make them suitable as coalition partners. Combining features of classic political parties and interest groups receiving support from ethnic minorities (Horowitz 2000) , the ethnic parties display high continuity on the political scene, benefit of relatively stable electorates, and show ideological flexibility. In the absence of a universalistic program, the ethnic parties do not pursue the enlargement of their supporters and voters. Instead, they appeal to particular ethnic groups and strive to mobilize most of the voters belonging to these groups (Horowitz 1985; Kitschelt 2001; Chandra and Metz 2002; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Chandra 2004: Ishiyama and Breuning 2011) . In doing so, they employ a within group catch-all discourse in which the ideology is considerably loosened.
Along these lines, in spite of their small size, the ethnic parties are stable political actors available to participate in coalition governments -with the exception of those coalitions including radical right parties (Gherghina 2009 ). While many Western European ethnic parties have low propensity to seek representation at central government, the post-communist ethnic parties are willing to become a government partner. Such an attitude originates in their belief that minorities' interests are best pursued when in office. Accordingly, the East European ethnic parties always participated in government coalitions when asked. These features gain increased relevance in the post-communist region where electoral volatility is high, consecutive elections are rarely won by the same party, and the number of entries or exits from the party system is generally high (Lewis 2000; van Biezen 2003; Millard 2004; Sikk 2005; Spirova 2007; Tavits 2008 ).
Consequently, we may expect the ethnic parties to be a familiar presence in the postcommunist government coalitions. In reality, the situation is different: out of the 44 ethnic parties securing parliamentary seats across all the post-communist countries with relevant ethnic minorities (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011) , only one third (15) got in the cabinet. Why is this the case?
Our article addresses this empirical puzzle and seeks to identify the causes impeding the ethnic parties to participate in the post-communist coalition governments. To this end, we conduct a cross-national and longitudinal analysis in which we take into account all the elections in which the ethnic parties gained parliamentary representation (the reserved seats are excluded). As this study aims to explain the absence of ethnic parties from government coalitions, the unit of analysis is the party in election (44 cases over two decades). We use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to map out the effects of organizational and electoral variables on the inclusion of ethnic parties in government coalitions.
Understanding under what conditions the ethnic parties are included in coalition governments bears theoretical importance -their participation into cabinets can moderate their discourse and thus better accommodate inter-ethnic relations in society. The key findings illustrate that particular aspects of organizational stability (at the level of leadership) and the pursuit of representation interests (involvement in ethnic issues) can drive the ethnic parties into opposition. The empirical evidence reveals the prevalence of this combined effect against other factors such as the pivotal role, splits and mergers, electoral strategies (alliances or radical discourses), or incumbency.
The article starts by providing a theoretical and conceptual framework on ethnic parties as a starting point for five testable hypotheses. We then provide details about the case selection, explain the method, and operationalize the variables. The third section identifies the determinants of ethnic parties' absence from coalition governments. Finally, we outline the main findings and discuss avenues for further research.
Impediments to Ethnic Parties' Access to Government Coalitions
There is general consensus that ethnic parties follow a different logic from parties with mass appeals. The functions of interest channeling, aggregation and representation are pursued by the ethnic parties only relative to regional or ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985) .
Ethnic parties give voice to ethnic political claims (Keating 1996; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Birnir 2007) and are institutional means to pursue ethnic goals (Rudolph and Thompson 1985; Stroschein 2011) . Ethnic parties portray themselves as the representatives of particular groups where they seek (and are dependent on) electoral support. Accordingly, the ethnic parties do not seek vote maximization, but rather constant support of the minorities they seek to represent (Horowitz 2000; Chandra and Metz 2002; van Cott 2003) . The centrality of this bondage between the ethnic parties and their voters is underlined by the existing classifications (de Winter 1998).
The role of ethnic parties in democratic societies is controversial. On the hand, a few scholars argue that such parties coincide with the emergence of conflict (Horowitz 1985) , deepen the divisions between ethnic groups (Hislope 1997) , and are thus detrimental to democratic settings (especially through the manifestation of ethnic outbidding). On the other hand, earlier research indicates the beneficial role of ethnic parties for the integration of disaffected groups, inter-ethnic cooperation, interest definition and representation, and collective action (Lijphart 1977; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Cohen 1997; Chandra 2004; Birnir 2007) . However, there are specific institutional factors that limit the positive impact of ethnic parties on democracy: the competition on the single dimension of ethnicity (Chandra 2005 ) and the exclusion from government (Birnir 2007) .
The latter observation is particularly relevant in the context of our study: the access to government coalitions of ethnic parties promotes flexible behavior of the ethnic group members, whereas the exclusion leads to intransigence and violence. Ethnic parties are included in government to isolate the macro-level concerns related to the stability of the majority-minority relations (i.e. part of the process of democratic consolidation).
This general argument applies at country level, but fails to account for the longitudinal variation within a country. It does not explain why ethnic parties participate only sometimes in government coalitions while the general relationships between majority and ethnic minorities are relatively constant. To explain this variation we focus on party level determinants. Our quest relies on the assumption drawn from the empirical realities that the ethnic parties are willing to be part of the government. In post-communist countries, the access to decision-making is best secured through a presence in govern- This empirical evidence suggests that in the post-communist region the ethnic parties are the competitors that are best able to mobilize a stable core of voters across time.
Outside the Government
This electoral stability diminishes the risks of exits from the political arena and fosters a continuous presence in parliament. Thus, they are available partners for most formateurs -with the exception of radical right parties -in deciding the composition of a government coalition.
Second, the ethnic parties do not have easily identifiable profiles on the ideological scale applicable to other parties. Their policy platforms rarely emphasize economic, political, or social issues on which most political actors compete. Instead, they include a broad range of issues addressing specific needs of the minorities (e.g. collective rights, territorial or cultural autonomy). In doing so, the ethnic parties position themselves either closer to the ideological median or more to the extremes -when outbid- A split usually leads to a shattering of the electorate and weakens its mobilization potential. Once the stable electoral support is threatened, the presence of the party on the political arena is also questioned. Accordingly, the ethnic party is less likely to represent a solid partner for the formateur.
Another indicator of organizational change is the party merger or fusion. Mergers are usually strategic: they target either the maximization of legislative seats (Crewe and King 1995) or the avoidance of electoral oblivion (Cox 1997 ). In the case of ethnic parties, an additional advantage is observable. A merger can safeguard larger electoral support within the minority group for the new party. In spite of these benefits, such an organizational change sends a message of instability. Apart from the fact that the party cannot be perceived as a monolith able to encapsulate the votes of minorities, a merger usually raises the question of duration. How long will the new party keep its current form? The identities of the parties deciding to fuse may emerge again and the threat of a split is quite credible. Along these lines, ethnic parties with recent merger experiences may be avoided in the coalition formation negotiations. For the purpose of this article, we also subsume to this causal condition the membership of an ethnic party in an ethnic electoral alliance -a coalition of at least two ethnic parties representing the same ethnic group formed in order to maximize the chances of these parties to gain seats. We consider this as a "temporary" form of merger (several political organizations pooling their resources for an electoral goal). Summing up, splits, mergers or the formation of temporary electoral alliances at the level of ethnic parties are likely to shed a negative light on their perceived stability and thus diminish their appeal to possible coalition partners.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that organizational splits or mergers impede the participation of ethnic parties to government coalitions (H1).
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The leadership complements the organizational aspects and is vital in the life of any organization (Huntington 1968 ). The three "faces" of parties proposed by Katz and Mair (1990; clearly outline the key roles of the central office and of the national leadership -either an individual or a committee -within a political party. In this respect, the leadership continuity is a relevant component of the party organization. Such a claim is even more relevant in the context of accumulated influence gained by contemporary party leaders in the legislature, electorate, and own organizations (Bean and Mughan 1989; Wattenberg 1991; Mughan 1993; Farrell 1996; Davis 1998; Scarrow et al. 2000) .
At the same time, leadership continuity is relevant for the relations established by parties with voters. Parties connect to citizens to achieve the exchange of voter mobilization for policy responsiveness. The linkage with voters can take place through direct communication initiated by party leaders (Poguntke 2002) . This is relatively simple, reaches a large audience in a short period of time, thus being effective and efficient. As a result, leaders can contribute to the creation of a recognizable label for political parties over the medium to long term. Thus, a leader becomes one component with which voters can identify.
Moreover, the stable ethnic voting amongst the minorities is mainly fueled by ethnic socialization through information shortcuts. The most important source of political learning for ethnic voters is the leaders of their own ethnic group (Birnir 2007) .
Leadership change can occur for a number of reasons: desire to alter the party line, low ideological cohesion between leaders and party organization, inability of the leader to continue (age, illness, personal matters etc.), low popularity of the leader, or personal conduct (e.g. corruption allegations). In any of these instances, a new leader sends a message of discontinuity. Going back to the issue of stability, a leadership change may be detrimental to the chances of ethnic parties to participate in a government coalition.
This internal dynamic, although aimed at improving things for the party in the future, can be regarded as troublesome by potential coalition partners. In this respect we may expect leadership change to reduce the chances of ethnic parties to participate in government coalitions (H2).
In theory, the ideological flexibility of the ethnic parties is a relevant asset. Their ability to form coalitions with parties situated to both sides of the centre is expected to enhance their chances to participate in government. However, the leverage provided by the ideological flexibility is not straightforward in post-communist countries. Previous Apart from these main effects, we control for the impact of incumbency and the existence of ethnic issues on the participation in government coalitions. To start with incumbency, the logic for government coalitions derives from the effects observed at voter level. In general, incumbent parties are directly affected by retrospective evaluations that are transformed into punishment or reward-based behavior on the part of voters (Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; Bellucci 1984; Ferejohn 1986; Lewis-Beck 1988 Accordingly, the lack of ethnic issues prior to elections may be an impediment for the ethnic parties' participation in government (H5).
Research Design
Our analysis focuses on the failure of ethnic parties from post-communist countries to join coalition governments between 1990 and 2011. Accordingly, the case selection was done in three steps. First, out of almost 30 European and Central Asian countries with communist regimes prior to 1990, we selected those with numerically relevant minorities. A minority group is relevant if its members account for at least 5% of the number of members from belonging to the majority group (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011) . Second, among these countries we were interested only in those where relevant minorities formed at least one ethnic party or political organization that competed in legislative elections. Third, for each election in each of these countries, we selected only those instances in which at least one ethnic party representing a relevant minority gained seats in the national legislature (or the lower Chamber for bicameral parliaments). In addition, three criteria were used to exclude particular cases: 1) countries or territories that did not govern themselves without the intervention of external authori- (Ragin 1989) . The use of QCA allows a case-oriented approach and requires good case knowledge to explain the linkage between the theory, the cases (the reality on the ground), and the findings of the analysis. In addition, QCA re-veals the interaction effects between the causal conditions included in the model and illustrate the cases associated to them, thus a allowing for their better understanding. Throughout the analysis we use the QCA specific language. The outcome is what we usually call the dependent variable, while the causal conditions are the determinants (independent variables). A few technical issues deserve close attention. First, QCA requires the labeling of each variable (both dependent and independent) with a single letter. For instance, if A is a variable, then whenever 'A' appears in an expression it indicates the presence of the causal condition. Whenever 'a' appears it means the absence of the causal condition and is read as 'NON A'. Second, the presence of any variable (condition or outcome) is coded 1, whereas the absence gets 0. Third, QCA uses logical operators-AND, OR and NON. AND is represented in an expression by the sign '*' (e.g. 'A*B') or by simply putting the two letters labeling the variables next to each other (e.g. 'AB'). OR is represented by the sign '+' (e.g. 'A+B').
NON is represented by using the lower case letter. Consequently, a proposition in QCA links the causal combination or a reunion of causal combinations and an outcome. If AB is a causal combination associated with of P (the outcome), the solution formula is 'AB  P'. However, this is only a logical relationship and should not automatically be associated with the existence of causality. A causal link between the term(s) on the two sides of '' is established on the basis of theory and empirical evidence that the observed relationship is actually taking place and that the term(s) on the left side of the proposition are actually cause(s) for the outcome, and the relationship is not a pure coincidence (Schneider and Grofman 2006) .
The outcome is easy to dichotomize (for variable operationalization, see Appendix 1):
it is present when the ethnic party joins the government coalition and absent when it fails to do so. MRF 1991 MRF , 2001 MRF , 2005 PDP 1994 PDP , 1998 DUI 2002 DUI , 2008 DUI , 2011 DPA 2006; DAHR 1996 DAHR , 2000 DAHR , 2004 PHC 1998 PHC , 2002 MH 2010 15 Yes MRF 1990 , 1994 , 2009 EUPP 1995 EUPP , 1999 NHP 1993 NHP , 1995 NHP , 1998 NHP , 2002 NHP , 2006 NHP , 2010 ER 1993 ER , 2006 LSP 1995; PDP 1994 PDP , 2002 PDP/DUI 2006; DPA 1998 DPA , 2002 DPA , 2008 DPA , 2011 NDR 2011; DAHR 1990 DAHR , 1992 DAHR , 2008 PHC 1994 PHC , 2006 MH 2012 29 No TOTAL 44
Analysis and Results
This section includes two main subsections each corresponding to the specific steps required by QCA (Ragin 1989) . We first conduct a necessity analysis. This is usually a routine step, but, as we will show, it already provides some useful results. We then focus on the cases in which the outcome does not occur and try to answer the research question. Throughout the analysis, we use two particular software packages: Tosmana and fsQCA.
No Necessary or Sufficient Condition
As a first step of our analysis, we test for the necessity (reflected in the consistency score) and sufficiency (reflected in the coverage score) of each causal condition (conducted for both the occurrence and the absence of the outcome). If one condition is necessary or sufficient, then the use of QCA is somewhat redundant as no interactions with other conditions are required to explain the outcome. Consequently, it is best to have the necessity and sufficiency scores for each condition below the 0.9 level of significance (Schneider and Grofman 2006) . Table 3 displays the results of this analysis. As all the results are below this threshold, we can proceed to the causal analysis. nation ABCde four out of five cases are in the same situation. Therefore, we include these combinations in the analysis and consider them as being associated with the absence of the outcome. 4 This compromise is reflected in the consistency score of our solution formulas -0.88, meaning that it will be associated with the absence of the outcome in only 88% of the cases (not in all the cases, as it is case when the consistency score is 1). However, we get 10 additional cases for analysis, making it more meaningful.
In both the complex and parsimonious solution formulas there is one combinationbdE -that does not change after the use of simplifying assumptions and explains over half of the cases (13 out of 24). Also, the cases corresponding to two other complex expressions are exactly the same after their simplification: the number of expressions in the solution formulas does not change, nor does the distribution of cases. Therefore, we move straight to the explanation of the parsimonious solution presented in Table 4 .
Condition A -organizational changes -is absent from the simple solution. Moreover, it is also absent from the simple solution for the cases when ethnic parties are included in government coalitions. Also, in the complex solution, A appears both as present and absent in different expressions. Thus, we can conclude that mergers, splits or electoral alliances within the same ethnic group do not play a role in determining whether ethnic parties are included in governing coalitions. However, we cannot completely refute H1 based on our data, because we cannot discard the potential role that the organizational aspects captured by this causal condition play in determining whether ethnic parties gain seats in the parliament in the first place. We use the full name for this party to distinguish it from the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP).
The combination bdE -no change in leadership (b), no incumbency (d), involvement in ethnic issues (E) -is associated with the absence of ethnic parties from governing coalitions in over 86% of the instances. This combination seems to depict quite radical ethnic parties that remain in the opposition for successive terms, adopt strong positions on ethnic issues, and have a rigid leadership. Moreover, they seem content with this approach to the representation of minorities, since they manage to gain enough support from the minority electorate to gain seats in the national parliaments, even if they do not join the government. Within our 13 cases corresponding to this combination, we find several parties that correspond to this description only at certain moments in their history and others that maintained these features constantly. In the first category, we have parties such as the MRF in Bulgaria, the DAHR in Romania, the PHC in Slovakia and the PDP in Macedonia. The first three can be found in this category only in instances from the first half of the analyzed period. In Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, the 90's were marked by tense interethnic relations, which almost constantly constituted a potential source of conflict. Most of the tensions were kept in the political arena and violence was rather local and sporadic. However, the lack of trust between the biggest main- The EUPP has been the main advocate for more rights for the Russian minority, often being regarded as the outcast among the mainstream Estonia parties. This is explains why it has not been regarded as a potential partner for a governing coalition.
The Latvian ethnic (Russian-supporting) parties in Latvia are distributed between the category described by this combination and the one corresponding to the combination Be, between changes in leadership (B) and no involvement in ethnic issues and 
